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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Appeals Chamber
Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor, 
Case No. ICTR-96-13-A 
On January 27, 2000, Trial Chamber I found Alfred
Musema guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity (for
extermination and rape) but not guilty of complicity in geno-
cide, conspiracy to commit genocide, crimes against human-
ity (for murder and other inhumane acts), or violations of Arti-
cle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II. The Trial Chamber sentenced Musema to life
imprisonment. Musema appealed both the conviction and the
sentence. On November 16, 2001, the Appeals Chamber
rendered its Judgment in Alfred Musema v. The Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-96-13-A. 
Musema’s first ground of appeal alleged that the Trial
Chamber failed to apply the correct burden and standard of
proof to the facts before it and, thereby, made errors of law
and fact in its assessment of the evidence. In particular,
Musema challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings with regard
to the credibility of Prosecution witnesses and took issue
with the Trial Chamber’s rejection of the alibi he raised at trial.
The Appeals Chamber dismissed all of Musema’s arguments
except those regarding the rape of Nyiramusugi on May 13,
1994. With respect to that charge, the Appeals Chamber
noted that the Defense’s submission of out-of court statements
by Witnesses CB and EB contradicted Prosecution Witness N’s
testimony during trial. The Appeals Chamber found that if
the testimonies of all three witnesses had been presented, a
reasonable tribunal of fact would have reached the conclu-
sion that there was reasonable doubt as to Musema’s guilt. The
Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber’s factual
and legal findings regarding the rape of Nyiramusugi were
incorrect and had occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Accord-
ingly, it quashed the conviction against Musema for the
crime against humanity involving rape. 
In his second, fourth, and fifth grounds of appeal,1 Musema
argued that the Trial Chamber did not ensure his right to a
fair trial in that it failed to respect his right to be informed
promptly and in detail of the nature of the charges against
him, his right to have adequate time for the preparation of
his defense and, lastly, his right to be tried without undue
delay. Specifically, in his second ground of appeal, Musema
claimed that his right to adequate time for the preparation
of his defense was prejudiced by the Trial Chamber’s decision
to allow the Prosecution to add witnesses to the initial witness
list, to call an expert witness, and to call witnesses whose
written statements were not disclosed to the Defense 60 days
before the trial date, as required by the ICTR Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence. The Appeals Chamber dismissed Muse-
ma’s argument, holding that Musema had waived his right to
appeal this issue by failing to raise it at trial. 
In the fourth ground of his appeal, Musema alleged that
the Trial Chamber erred by allowing the Prosecution to add
new charges to the Indictment during the trial. In the fifth
ground, Musema alleged that the Trial Chamber erred by find-
ing that the Prosecution’s failure to formally serve him with
the Amended Indictment did not infringe his rights under
Articles 19 and 20 of the ICTR Statute. The Appeals Cham-
ber deemed it unnecessary to consider these last two grounds
of appeal since both concerned Count 7 of the Indictment
(crime against humanity for rape), which was quashed based
on Musema’s first ground of appeal. However, the Appeals
Chamber observed in dicta that when granting the Prosecu-
tion leave to amend an indictment, the Trial Chamber must
respect the Accused’s fundamental rights and “the more
belatedly the amendment is effected, the more it is likely to
penalize the Accused.”
In his sixth ground of appeal, Musema argued that the
Trial Chamber erred in finding him guilty of both genocide
and crimes against humanity (for extermination) based on
the same set of facts. In addition to ruling that cumulative
charging of offenses is generally permitted, the Appeals
Chamber applied the criteria discussed in the 
v
Celebic´i ICTY
Appeal Judgment to determine when multiple convictions
based on the same set of facts may be entered or affirmed.
Quoting from 
v
Celebic´i, the Appeals Chamber stated that:
“‘multiple criminal convictions entered under different statu-
tory provisions but based on the same conduct are permissi-
ble only if each statutory provision involved has a materially
distinct element not contained in the other. An element is
materially distinct from another if it requires proof of a fact
not required by the other.’” Applying the 
v
Celebic´i test, the
Appeals Chamber held that the convictions for genocide
and crimes against humanity (extermination) are permissi-
ble since there are distinct elements under each crime. The
distinct element in genocide is an intent to destroy a targeted
group in whole or in part. Extermination as a crime against
humanity requires proof that the act form part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population. Thus, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed Musema’s sixth ground of appeal.
In his appeal against the sentence, Musema argued that
the Trial Chamber erred by failing to: 1) consider the need
to develop a range of sentences based on an accused’s role
in the broader context of Rwanda’s conflict; 2) pass a sentence
commensurate with other sentences imposed by the ICTR for
genocide convictions; and 3) duly consider the mitigating
factors in his case. Articulating the standard of review for
sentences imposed by the ICTR, the Appeals Chamber noted
that it would not revise a sentence unless it believed that the
Trial Chamber had committed a “discernible error” in exer-
cising its discretion, or failed to follow the applicable law.
While acknowledging the existence in ICTY jurisprudence of
a general principle that sentences should be graduated
according to the relative position of a convicted person in a
command structure, the Chamber emphasized that the grav-
ity of the offense is the primary consideration in imposing
sentence. Noting that Musema’s offenses were of the utmost
gravity, the Appeals Chamber found that Musema had failed
to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber ventured outside its
“discretionary framework in imposing the maximum sen-
tence of life imprisonment” and dismissed Musema’s first
argument. After an assessment of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in Musema’s case, the Appeals
Chamber found material differences between his case and that
of Serushago, who plead guilty to one count of genocide and
three counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermi-
nation, and torture), and dismissed his second argument. In
response to his third argument, the Appeals Chamber found
that Musema failed to demonstrate that the Trial Chamber
erred in exercising its discretion as to the weight accorded to
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the mitigating circumstances in his case. In affirming the
sentence, the Appeals Chamber noted that the quashing of
the conviction for the crime against humanity (for rape)
had no impact on its dismissal of Musema’s appeal, as “[t]here
is no doubt that the Trial Chamber’s findings as to the sen-
tence to be imposed on Musema would have been the same
if it had acquitted Musema of the charge in question.” 
Judge Shahabuddeen supported the judgment but wrote
separately to clarify his understanding of two issues: 1) the reli-
ability of evidence; and 2) the test for upholding a conviction
based on additional evidence admitted during appellate pro-
ceedings. He stated that in general, the credibility of evi-
dence must be assumed, rather than assessed, at the admis-
sibility stage; reliability is a component of credibility and, as
such, goes to weight of the evidence and must be assessed later.
However, a different rule applies with respect to hearsay evi-
dence. Because of its nature, hearsay evidence may require
an initial determination of reliability at the admissibility
stage. Even then, ICTY jurisprudence demonstrates that
definitive proof of reliability is not necessary as a condition
of admissibility; rather provisional proof is all that is required
at that stage. Secondly, Judge Shahabuddeen noted that the
test for upholding a conviction based on additional evidence
submitted at the appellate level should be whether such evi-
dence could have been a decisive factor in reaching the deci-
sion below, not whether the conclusion reached by the tri-
bunal below on the assessed evidence was one which no
reasonable tribunal would have reached on that evidence.
The Prosecutor v Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana
Appeal, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A
On May 21, 1999, the Trial Chamber rendered its judgment
in the case of Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, who
were both accused of involvement in the massacres that took
place in the préfecture of Kibuye in 1994. The Trial Chamber
convicted Clément Kayishema of four counts of genocide
and sentenced him to life in prison. Obed Ruzindana was con-
victed of one count of genocide and sentenced to 25 years
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber found the accused not
guilty of crimes against humanity, finding that those charges
were fully subsumed by the counts brought under the charge
of genocide, and acquitted the accused of violations of Arti-
cle 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II. Both accused appealed the conviction and the sen-
tence. The Prosecution appealed the judgment and sentence
against Ruzindana. On June 1, 2001, the Appeals Chamber ren-
dered its judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v.Clément Kay-
ishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A. 
In his appeal, Kayishema argued that the trial was unfair
and that the Trial Chamber erred in its: 1) assessment of his
role as préfet; 2) evaluation of his individual and command
responsibility as préfet; 3) assessment of the meaning and
application of civil defense to the Rwandan conflict; and 4)
findings and application of the law regarding the crime of
genocide. Ruzindana also claimed that the trial was unfair.
In addition, he alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in law
and fact with respect to its: 1) assessment of intent; 2) find-
ings regarding individual responsibility; 3) findings on his role
regarding the crime of genocide; 4) findings on common
criminal intent; 5) findings on his personal status; 6) findings
regarding his alibi defense; and 7) appraisal of the Prosecu-
tion’s evidence. With respect to sentencing, both Kayishema
and Ruzindana alleged that the Trial Chamber erred in its
assessment of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in their case. Because several issues and grounds of appeal
overlap, the Appeals Chamber grouped together some
grounds of appeal and addressed others separately. Simi-
larly, this summary will discuss the general issues decided by
the Appeals Chamber rather than addressing each ground of
appeal separately.2
Fair Trial Issues
The Appeals Chamber rejected all arguments presented
by Kayishema in ground one and Ruzindana in ground eight
of their respective appeals that they were denied a fair trial.
Kayishema alleged his trial was unfair for various reasons,
including that: 1) the Tribunal was under the political influ-
ence of the United Nations and the government of Rwanda
and, therefore, lacked independence; and 2) the Trial Cham-
ber violated the principle of “equality of arms” by failing to,
inter alia, guarantee the parties equality of means and
resources. Noting that the Tribunal is a judicial organ inde-
pendent of other UN organs and that Kayishema failed to
articulate any particular pressure allegedly exerted by Rwanda
on the Tribunal, the Appeals Chamber rejected Kayishema’s
first argument. The Chamber also rejected Kayishema’s argu-
ment that the principle of “equality of arms” had been com-
promised. Citing the standard adopted by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in the Tadi´c case, the Chamber noted that the rule
providing the parties with equal opportunity to present their
cases does not compel an equality of resources.3
Ruzindana claimed he was denied a fair trial because, as
a result of the lack of specificity in the indictment, he was not
promptly informed of the nature of the charges against him
or allowed adequate time and resources to prepare his
defense. The Appeals Chamber rejected his claim because he
had neither raised this issue at trial nor alleged special cir-
cumstances that would have permitted the Chamber to con-
sider the issue on appeal. 
Defense of Alibi
Both Kayishema and Ruzindana raised several arguments
relating to their alibi defenses, including that the Trial Cham-
ber erred by shifting the burden of proof to the accused
and incorrectly assessing the evidence submitted in support
of their alibi defenses. The Appeals Chamber rejected Kay-
ishema’s claim that the Trial Chamber shifted the burden of
proof to the defense. Relying on the Foca and 
v
Celebic´i cases,
the Chamber affirmed that it is the duty of the Prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
even when an alibi defense is raised. In other words, while the
accused must provide the Prosecution with notice and the evi-
dence upon which he will rely to establish his alibi, the Pros-
ecution retains the burden of establishing the truth of the facts
in the indictment. The accused must merely produce suffi-
cient evidence to raise reasonable doubt regarding the Pros-
ecution’s case. The Appeals Chamber found that Kayishema
failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise such doubt. 
In his sixth ground of appeal, Ruzindana asserted that the
Trial Chamber erred by failing to consider the evidence relat-
ing to his alibi defense in a comprehensive manner. The
Appeals Chamber noted that it was bound to respect the
Trial Chamber’s approach as long as it was reasonable. The
Appeals Chamber stated that the Trial Chamber had not only
considered individual witness statements, but also conducted
an overall assessment of the evidence in order to verify the cred-
ibility of the witnesses and to evaluate whether the evidence
raised doubt regarding the accused’s presence at the site of
the alleged massacres. Noting that such an approach was rea-
sonable, the Appeals Chamber dismissed Ruzindana’s claim. 
Genocide
In his sixth ground of appeal, Kayishema alleged errors in
the Trial Chamber’s findings on the evidence offered to prove
the crime of genocide, in addition to the manner in which the
Trial Chamber applied the law to the facts when assessing Kay-
ishema’s individual circumstances. The Appeals Chamber
continued on next page
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confirmed that the Trial Chamber has broad discretion with
respect to its analysis of evidence for fact-finding purposes. Not-
ing that a successful challenge must show that the Trial Cham-
ber’s analysis was unreasonable, the Appeals Chamber con-
cluded that Kayishema failed to meet this burden and, thus,
rejected his challenge on this matter. In particular, the Appeals
Chamber rejected Kayishema’s claim that he lacked the req-
uisite mens rea for the crime of genocide because he had
ordered 72 children who survived the massacre to be taken to
a hospital. The Chamber noted that in light of all the evidence
presented, this fact had little bearing on whether Kayishema
possessed the requisite mens rea. 
On the mixed factual and legal ground of appeal relating
to the interpretation of the word “meurtre,” the Appeals Cham-
ber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s conclusion that there is “vir-
tually” no difference between “meurtre” and “killing” within
the context of genocide. The Appeals Chamber concluded
that even if there were a difference between the two terms,
both refer to intentional but not necessarily premeditated
murder and that, in any event, such interpretation would not
improve Kayishema’s case.
Ruzindana’s first ground of appeal asserted that the Trial
Chamber erred in its findings on mens rea. Specifically, he
asserted there was no proof that he had the requisite specific
intent to commit the crime of genocide. The Appeals Cham-
ber concurred with the Trial Chamber’s conclusions that
while explicit manifestations of criminal intent are often
rare, intent may be demonstrated by persistent patterns of con-
duct and inferred from an individual’s utterances and actions.
Therefore, the Trial Chamber appropriately considered this
kind of evidence in arriving at the conclusion that Ruzindana
possessed the requisite intent. Noting the distinction between
motive and intent, the Appeals Chamber also rejected Ruzin-
dana’s claim that his personal motives for acting the way he
did precluded the presence of the requisite mens rea for
genocide. Finally, the Appeals Chamber accepted Ruzin-
dana’s argument that the Trial Chamber failed to define the
phrase “persistent pattern of conduct.” However, it noted that
because such a pattern is not an element of the crime of geno-
cide, the Trial Chamber was not obliged to define it. 
The Chamber also rejected Ruzindana’s third ground of
appeal, in which he claimed that a nexus was required
between the manner in which genocide was carried out and
the personal circumstances of an accused. Specifically, Ruzin-
dana claimed genocide requires proof that the accused had
the means or resources necessary to prepare for and commit
genocide. The Chamber held that proof of such a nexus is
unnecessary under the law.
Individual Responsibility
In his second ground of appeal, Ruzindana argued that the
Trial Chamber erred in finding him individually responsible
for committing killings because the Prosecution failed to estab-
lish a resulting death. Citing the Tadi´c case, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the test for direct commission under Arti-
cle 6(1) of the ICTR Statute is whether the individual directly
participated in the crime and had the requisite knowledge.
The Chamber concluded that establishing individual respon-
sibility does not require a showing that the individual’s actions
resulted in death. However, where there is a question regard-
ing the material fact of whether a death resulted, it is appro-
priately determined by the Trial Chamber in its assessment
of the evidence. The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial
Chamber had found Ruzindana responsible for at least one
death, that of victim Beatrice. Additionally, the Appeals
Chamber noted that individual responsibility under Article
6(1) of the ICTR Statute attaches not only to direct physical
participation, but also to acts of participation that contribute
to, or have an effect on, the commission of the crime. The
Appeals Chamber recalled that Ruzindana was also found indi-
vidually responsible under Article 6(1) for instigating, order-
ing, committing and otherwise aiding and abetting in the
preparation and execution of a massacre with genocidal
intent. As proof of resulting death is not a necessary ele-
ment in the determination of individual responsibility under
Article 6(1), the Appeals Chamber dismissed this claim.4
Although Ruzindana’s fourth ground of appeal was not
clear, the Appeals Chamber interpreted his claim to be that
the Trial Chamber erred in its definition of criminal respon-
sibility on the basis of participation in a common purpose or
design and in its application of this definition to his case.
Citing the Tadi´c case, the Appeals Chamber noted that this
mode of participation in one of the crimes under the ICTR
Statute does not require that the plan or purpose be previ-
ously arranged or formulated. Therefore, while meeting
physically or by telephone may be a relevant factor to be
considered, those acts are not constitutive of the actus reus
element required for individual responsibility to attach
pursuant to the common purpose doctrine. Thus, this claim
was dismissed.5
In his third ground of appeal, Kayishema challenged the
Trial Chamber’s findings regarding his individual criminal
responsibility for genocide. In particular, he challenged the
Chamber’s findings regarding his intent and actual partici-
pation in the crime. The Appeals Chamber noted that intent
may be inferred from an individual’s participation in a crime,
particularly from his aiding and abetting behavior. The
Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s finding that
Kayishema had the requisite criminal intent because the
combination of his authority and passive presence at crime
sites amounted to tacit encouragement. Additionally, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed Kayishema’s claim that the Trial
Chamber erred in finding actual participation, noting that the
Appellant had failed to show that any of the Trial Chambers
findings were so unreasonable as to result in a miscarriage of
justice. 
In his second ground of appeal, Kayishema challenged the
Trial Chamber’s finding of criminal command responsibility
under Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute. He suggested that the
Trial Chamber erroneously concluded that as préfet, he had
de jure authority over the assailants present during the mas-
sacres in question. Further, he claimed that as he had no de
jure authority, he could not in fact exercise any authority
over those individuals, such as preventing or punishing the
crimes in question. Citing the
v
Celebic´i case, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that the appropriate test, whether in the context
of de jure or de facto authority, was whether the superior had
effective control over the persons committing the alleged
crimes. The Appeals Chamber found that Kayishema failed
to show that the Trial Chamber’s findings regarding his
effective control were so unreasonable as to result in a mis-
carriage of justice. 
Additional Fact-Finding Issues
In their appeal, the Appellants challenged the Trial Cham-
ber’s evaluation of witness credibility and other evidence. The
Appeals Chamber reaffirmed that the Trial Chamber retains
broad discretion with respect to determining witness credi-
bility and overall assessment of the evidence. 
In his claim that the Trial Chamber made factual errors
with respect to its genocide analysis, for instance, Kayishema
argued that testimony regarding injuries sustained by a wit-
ness should have been corroborated. The Appeals Chamber
rejected the argument, stating that under Tadi´c, corrobora-
tion was not necessary. In his third ground of appeal,
38
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Kayishema also challenged the Trial Chamber’s assessment
of the credibility of the witness who identified him. The
Appeals Chamber dismissed the argument, holding that it is
within the Trial Chamber’s discretion to assess the probative
value of testimony, including how to resolve apparent con-
tradictions. 
Similarly, in ground seven of his appeal, Ruzindana sug-
gested that the Trial Chamber erred in not using established
criteria to analyze the credibility of Prosecution witnesses; in
particular, he claimed that accepting the testimony of one wit-
ness on a particular matter was unreasonable and unreli-
able. In its rejection of Ruzindana’s claim, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that it is impossible to draw up an exhaustive list
of criteria for the assessment of evidence, given that the cir-
cumstances of each case are different and that a judge must
rule on each case in an impartial and independent manner.
Dismissing Ruzindana’s specific claim, the Chamber rea-
soned that accepting the uncorroborated testimony of a wit-
ness does not necessarily constitute error. 
Sentencing
Kayishema’s ground eight and Ruzindana’s ground nine
challenged the Trial Chamber’s analysis of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in general, and with respect to
their particular circumstances. As a general point, the Appeals
Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber has broad discretion
in weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances at sen-
tencing. Additionally, the Appeals Chamber stated that, pur-
suant to Articles 6(4) and 23 of the ICTR Statute and Rule
101, the Appellant must prove that the Trial Chamber acted
beyond its discretion in sentencing the accused. 
The Appeals Chamber rejected Ruzindana’s claim that by
taking into account the heinous means by which he commit-
ted the killings, the Trial Chamber confused a material element
of the crime with an aggravating circumstance. The Appeals
Chamber reasoned that the fact that an act of killing supported
a conviction of genocide does not prevent a separate finding
that the manner in which it was carried out gave rise to an
aggravating factor. It also concluded that there was no abuse
of discretion in the way the Trial Chamber weighed the aggra-
vating against the mitigating circumstances in his case. 
The Appeals Chamber also rejected Kayishema’s claim that
the Trial Chamber punished him twice by identifying his
position of authority as an essential element in the crime of
genocide and an aggravating factor. The Chamber explained
that although a mere finding of command authority cannot
be considered an aggravating circumstance, the manner in
which an accused exercises that authority can be an aggra-
vating circumstance. In addition, the Chamber found that the
zeal shown by the accused in committing the crimes and the
harm suffered by the victims were properly characterized as
aggravating factors. Finally, the Appeals Chamber stated that
even if the Trial Chamber had erred in finding that Kay-
ishema’s denial of guilt and assertion of an alibi constituted
aggravating factors, such error did not invalidate the sentence
imposed since the primary aggravating factor was the gravity
of the offense. 
*Maria Allison, author of the summary of the Kayishema and
Ruzindana appeals, is a political analyst in the District of Colum-
bia. Leslie Wilson, author of the summary of the Musema Appeal,
is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law. 
**Susana SáCouto is the legal coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.
ENDNOTES
1 Musema withdrew his third ground of appeal. 
2 The Appeals Chamber did not address the merits of the Prosecu-
tion’s appeal, finding the appeal inadmissible because of the Prosecu-
tion’s failure to file its appellate brief on time and to demonstrate good
cause for filing out of time. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Sha-
habuddeen concluded that the Prosecution had filed its appellate brief
on time and that even if it had not, the Appeals Chamber could have
granted the Prosecution an extension of its own accord, as, in his opin-
ion, the Prosecution had demonstrated good cause for an extension of
time to file. 
3 Kayishema raised three additional arguments supporting his unfair
trial claim, namely that: 1) the expression “persons responsible for” in Secu-
rity Council Resolution 955 and procedural improprieties in the case com-
promised his right to the presumption of innocence; 2) the court failed
to adhere to the adversarial principle; and 3) the Prosecution failed to
timely disclose evidence. The Appeals Chamber dismissed all three
arguments, finding the first two allegations meritless and rejecting the
third claim because it had not been raised at trial.
4 In support of his argument regarding the insufficiency of evidence
provided by the Prosecution on the specific intent requirement of geno-
cide, Ruzindana also challenged the Trial Chamber’s findings regard-
ing his authority during the events in question, claiming the Prosecution
had not established that he had either de jure or de facto authority. Not-
ing that neither is required for a finding of individual criminal respon-
sibility under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute, the Appeals Chamber
rejected this argument as well.
5 Ruzindana’s fifth ground of appeal asserted that the Trial Cham-
ber made errors of fact with respect to its analysis of his personal status.
This ground failed because Ruzindana failed to put forward an argument
in support of his claim.
The exclusion of international law, human rights standards, and
UN resolutions from past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has been
extremely detrimental to Palestinian refugees and has contributed
to the breakdown of the political process. BADIL asserts that the
Expert Forum will bring together legal and academic experts, politi-
cians, and practitioners of refugee and general human rights law
to pave the way toward treaty-based human rights solutions to the
Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with UN Resolution 194.
The first international seminar, “The Role of International Law
in Peacemaking and Crafting Durable Solutions for Palestinian
Refugees,” will be hosted by the University of Ghent in Ghent, Bel-
gium from May 22-23, 2003. Additional seminars will follow in
Europe and Cairo, focusing on property restitution, international
and regional protection mechanisms, and obstacles to the imple-
mentation of refugee return and restitution. 
In March, BADIL will publish, in Hebrew, an information
packet on the Right of Return. The packet will be based on
BADIL’s Arabic and English language information packets pub-
lished on the same topic in 2000. BADIL’s Hebrew packet was
created in order to answer the questions and concerns raised in
the Israeli debate about Palestinian refugees’ right to return to
their homes and properties now located in Israel. The Hebrew
language packet will serve as a tool for exploring the potential
of a rational, rights-based dialogue with Israeli peace and human
rights activists, educators, academic researchers and journalists.
The packet will include facts and figures, responses to frequently
asked questions, and international legal briefs and testimonials
from Palestinian refugees regarding their vision for a just and
durable solution to their plight. For more information about
BADIL, please e-mail info@badil.org, or visit its Web site at
www.badil.org. 
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